Abstract
For the linear Hotelling model with firms located at the boundaries of the segment line, we study the price competition in a scenario of incomplete information in the production costs of both firms. We introduce the bounded uncertain costs (BUC) condition in the production costs and we prove that there is a local optimum price strategy if and only if the BUC condition holds. We compute explicitly the local optimum price strategy and we prove that it does not depend upon the distributions of the production costs of the firms, except on their first moments. We prove that the ex-post profit of a firm is smaller than its ex-ante profit if and only if the production cost of the other firm is greater than its expected cost.

Abstract
We study a finite decision model where the utility function is an additive combination of a personal valuation component and an interaction component. Individuals are characterized according to these two components (their valuation type and externality type), and also according to their crowding type (how they influence others). We study how positive externalities lead to typo symmetries euillbrIn, while negative externalities allow the existence of equillibria that are not type-symmetric. In particular, we show that positive elides lead to euilibria having a unique partition into a minimum number of societies (simi individuals using the same strategy, see 1271); and negat ve externalities I to equilibria with multiple societal partitions, some with the maximum number of societies

Abstract
We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

Abstract

Abstract
In this paper, we characterize two power indices introduced in [1] using two different modifications of the monotonicity property first stated by [2]. The sets of properties are easily comparable among them and with previous characterizations of other power indices.

Abstract