Abstract
This paper proposes a new problem by integrating the job shop scheduling, the part feeding, and the automated storage and retrieval problems. These three problems are intertwined and the performance of each of these problems influences and is influenced by the performance of the other problems. We consider a manufacturing environment composed of a set of machines (production system) connected by a transport system and a storage/retrieval system. Jobs are retrieved from storage and delivered to a load/unload area (LU) by the automated storage retrieval system. Then they are transported to and between the machines where their operations are processed on by the transport system. Once all operations of a job are processed, the job is taken back to the LU and then returned to the storage cell. We propose a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model that can be solved to optimality for small-sized instances. We also propose a hybrid simulated annealing (HSA) algorithm to find good quality solutions for larger instances. The HSA incorporates a late acceptance hill-climbing algorithm and a multistart strategy to promote both intensification and exploration while decreasing computational requirements. To compute the optimality gap of the HSA solutions, we derive a very fast lower bounding procedure. Computational experiments are conducted on two sets of instances that we also propose. The computational results show the effectiveness of the MILP on small-sized instances as well as the effectiveness, efficiency, and robustness of the HSA on medium and large-sized instances. Furthermore, the computational experiments clearly shown that importance of optimizing the three problems simultaneous. Finally, the importance and relevance of including the storage/retrieval activities are empirically demonstrated as ignoring them leads to wrong and misleading results.

Abstract

Abstract
We introduce an evolutionary dynamical model for corruption in a democratic state describing the interactions between citizens, government and officials, where the voting power of the citizens is the main mechanism to control corruption. Three main scenarios for the evolution of corruption emerge depending on the efficiency of the institutions and the social, political, and economic characteristics of the State. Efficient institutions can create a corruption intolerant self-reinforcing mechanism. The lack of political choices, weaknesses of institutions and vote buying can create a self-reinforcing mechanism of corruption. The ambition of the rulers can induce high levels of corruption that can be fought by the voting power of the citizens creating corruption cycles.

Abstract
In two-action generalized polymatrix games, Nash equilibria are support-type-symmetric, i.e., determined by supports for each type of player. We show that such a property does not generalize straightforwardly for games with at least three actions or where interaction weights have different signs (neither all positive nor negative). A non-trivial condition on interaction weights must be satisfied, which may go unnoticed as it is trivially satisfied for: (i) two-action games, (ii) conformity games, and (iii) congestion games. We derive this condition and the corresponding simplified analytic equation for mixed strategies.

Abstract
We study an evolutionary dynamics for the contributions by agents to a common/public good in a generalized version of Baliga and Maskin's environmental protection model. The dynamical equilibria consist of three scenarios: a single agent contributing to preserve the good with its optimal contribution level, and all the other agents being free-riders: a group of agents with the same optimal contribution level contributing to preserve the good, and all the other agents being free-riders; one where no agents contribute. The dynamics of the contributions can be complex but we prove that each trajectory converges to the equilibrium associated to the single agent (or group of agents) with the highest preference for the good that are contributing since the beginning. We note that while the aggregate contribution is below the optimal contribution level of the agent with the smallest preference for the good, then the aggregate contribution is increasing and there is no free-riding. Hence, if the optimal contribution level of the agent with the smallest preference is enough to not exhaust the good too quickly and the optimal contribution level of the agent with the greatest preference is enough to preserve the good, then, in spite of the appearance of free-riding in the contributions, the good might not be exhausted.

Abstract
We study the optimal consumption, investment and life-insurance purchase and selection strategies for a wage-earner with an uncertain lifetime with access to a financial market comprised of one risk-free security and one risky-asset whose prices evolve according to linear diffusions modulated by a continuous-time stochastic process determined by an additional diffusive nonlinear stochastic differential equation. The process modulating the linear diffusions may be regarded as an indicator describing the state of the economy in a given instant of time. Additionally, we allow the Brownian motions driving each of these equations to be correlated. The life-insurance market under consideration herein consists of a fixed number of providers offering pairwise distinct contracts. We use dynamic programming techniques to characterize the solutions to the problem described above for a general family of utility functions, studying the case of discounted constant relative risk aversion utilities with more detail.