Abstract

Abstract
This paper fits in the theory of international agreements by studying the success of stable coalitions of agents seeking the preservation of a public good. Extending Baliga and Maskin, we consider a model of N homogeneous agents with quasi-linear utilities of the form u(j) (r(j); r) = r(alpha) - r(j), where r is the aggregate contribution and the exponent alpha is the elasticity of the gross utility. When the value of the elasticity alpha increases in its natural range (0, 1), we prove the following five main results in the formation of stable coalitions: (i) the gap of cooperation, characterized as the ratio of the welfare of the grand coalition to the welfare of the competitive singleton coalition grows to infinity, which we interpret as a measure of the urge or need to save the public good; (ii) the size of stable coalitions increases from 1 up to N; (iii) the ratio of the welfare of stable coalitions to the welfare of the competitive singleton coalition grows to infinity; (iv) the ratio of the welfare of stable coalitions to the welfare of the grand coalition decreases (a lot), up to when the number of members of the stable coalition is approximately N/e and after that it increases (a lot); and (v) the growth of stable coalitions occurs with a much greater loss of the coalition members when compared with free-riders. Result (v) has two major drawbacks: (a) A priori, it is difficult to convince agents to be members of the stable coalition and (b) together with results (i) and (iv), it explains and leads to the pessimistic Barrett's paradox of cooperation, even in a case not much considered in the literature: The ratio of the welfare of the stable coalitions against the welfare of the grand coalition is small, even in the extreme case where there are few (or a single) free-riders and the gap of cooperation is large. Optimistically, result (iii) shows that stable coalitions do much better than the competitive singleton coalition. Furthermore, result (ii) proves that the paradox of cooperation is resolved for larger values of.. so that the grand coalition is stabilized.

Abstract
We model the financial markets as a game and make predictions using Markov chain estimators. We extract the possible patterns displayed by the financial markets, define a game where one of the players is the speculator, whose strategies depend on his/her risk-to-reward preferences, and the market is the other player, whose strategies are the previously observed patterns. Then, we estimate the market's mixed probabilities by defining Markov chains and utilizing its transition matrices. Afterwards, we use these probabilities to determine which is the optimal strategy for the speculator. Finally, we apply these models to real-time market data to determine its feasibility. From this, we obtained a model for the financial markets that has a good performance in terms of accuracy and profitability.

Abstract
Among transportation researchers, pedestrian issues are highly significant, and various solutions have been proposed to address these challenges. These approaches include Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) and machine learning (ML) techniques, often categorized into two primary types. While previous studies have addressed diverse methods and transportation issues, this research integrates pedestrian modeling with MCDA and ML approaches. This paper examines how MCDA and ML can be combined to enhance decision-making in pedestrian dynamics. Drawing on a review of 1574 papers published from 1999 to 2023, this study identifies prevalent themes and methodologies in MCDA, ML, and pedestrian modeling. The MCDA methods are categorized into weighting and ranking techniques, with an emphasis on their application to complex transportation challenges involving both qualitative and quantitative criteria. The findings suggest that hybrid MCDA algorithms can effectively evaluate ML performance, addressing the limitations of traditional methods. By synthesizing the insights from the existing literature, this review outlines key methodologies and provides a roadmap for future research in integrating MCDA and ML in pedestrian dynamics. This research aims to deepen the understanding of how informed decision-making can enhance urban environments and improve pedestrian safety.

Abstract
A model of Edgeworthian economies is studied, in which participants are randomly chosen at each period to exchange two goods to increase their utilities, as described by the Cobb-Douglas utility function. Participants can trade deviating from their bilateral equilibrium, provided that the market and the trade follow appropriate symmetry conditions. The article aims to study the convergence to equilibrium in a situation where individuals or small groups of participants trade in a market, and prices are determined by interactions between the participants rather than by demand and supply alone. A dynamic matching and bargaining game is considered, with statistical duality imposed on the market game, ensuring that each participant has a counterpart with opposite preferences. This guaranties that there is sufficient incentive for trade. It is shown that, in each period, the expected logarithm of the trading price in the Edgeworthian economy equals the expected Walrasian price. This demonstrates that, under symmetry conditions, the trading price in the Edgeworthian economy is related to the Walrasian price, indicating convergence of the trading price in the Edgeworthian economy towards the Walrasian price. The study suggests that, under the right conditions, the decentralized trading model leads to price convergence similar to what would be expected in a more classical Walrasian economy, where prices balance demand and supply.