Abstract
In an avoidable harmful situation, autonomous vehicles systems are expected to choose the course of action that causes the less damage to everybody. However, this behavioral protocol implies some predictability. In this context, we show that if the autonomous vehicle decision process is perfectly known then malicious, opportunistic, terrorist, criminal and non-civic individuals may have incentives to manipulate it. Consequently, some levels of uncertainty are necessary for the system to be manipulation proof. Uncertainty removes the mis-behavior incentives because it increases the risk and likelihood of unsuccessful manipulation. However, uncertainty may also decrease the quality of the decision process with negative impact in terms of efficiency and welfare for the society. We also discuss other possible solutions to this problem.

Abstract
We study the equilibria of an Ordinary Differencial Equation (ODE) system where CD4+ effector or helper T cells and Regulatory T cells (Tregs) are present. T cells trigger an immune response in the presence of their specific antigen. Regulatory T cells (Tregs) play a role in limiting auto-immune diseases due to their immune-suppressive ability. Here, we present explicit exact formulas that give the relationship between the concentration of T cells, the concentration of Tregs, and the antigenic stimulation of T cells, when the system is at equilibria, stable or unstable. We found a parameter region of bistability, limited by two thresholds of antigenic stimulation of T cells (hysteresis). Moreover, there are values of the slope parameter of the tuning for which an isola-center bifurcation appears, and, for some other values, there is a transcritical bifurcation. We also present time evolutions of the ODE system.

Abstract

Abstract
Inspired by the Daley-Kendall and Goffman-Newill models, we propose an Ignorant-Believer-Unbeliever rumor (or fake news) spreading model with the following characteristics: (i) a network contact between individuals that determines the spread of rumors; (ii) the value (cost versus benefit) for individuals who search for truthful information (learning); (iii) an impact measure that assesses the risk of believing the rumor; (iv) an individual search strategy based on the probability that an individual searches for truthful information; (v) the population search strategy based on the proportion of individuals of the population who decide to search for truthful information; (vi) a payoff for the individuals that depends on the parameters of the model and the strategies of the individuals. Furthermore, we introduce evolutionary information search dynamics and study the dynamics of population search strategies. For each value of searching for information, we compute evolutionarily stable information (ESI) search strategies (occurring in non-cooperative environments), which are the attractors of the information search dynamics, and the optimal information (OI) search strategy (occurring in (eventually forced) cooperative environments) that maximizes the expected information payoff for the population. For rumors that are advantageous or harmful to the population (positive or negative impact), we show the existence of distinct scenarios that depend on the value of searching for truthful information. We fully discuss which evolutionarily stable information (ESI) search strategies and which optimal information (OI) search strategies eradicate (or not) the rumor and the corresponding expected payoffs. As a corollary of our results, a recommendation for legislators and policymakers who aim to eradicate harmful rumors is to make the search for truthful information free or rewarding.

Abstract
One of the most significant challenges for machine learning nowadays is the discovery of causal relationships from data. This causal discovery is commonly performed using Bayesian like algorithms. However, more recently, more and more causal discovery algorithms have appeared that do not fall into this category. In this paper, we present a new algorithm that explores global causal association rules with Uncertainty Coefficient. Our algorithm, CRPA-UC, is a global structure discovery approach that combines the advantages of association mining with causal discovery and can be applied to binary and non-binary discrete data. This approach was compared to the PC algorithm using several well-known data sets, using several metrics.

Abstract
In this paper we propose and analyze a game theoretical model regarding the dynamical interaction between government fiscal policy choices toward innovation and training (I&T), firm's innovation, and worker's levels of training and education. We discuss four economic scenarios corresponding to strict pure Nash equilibria: the government and I&T poverty trap, the I&T poverty trap, the I&T high premium niche, and the I&T ideal growth. The main novelty of this model is to consider the government as one of the three interacting players in the game that also allow us to analyse the I&T mixed economic scenarios with a unique strictly mixed Nash equilibrium and with I&T evolutionary dynamical cycles.