Abstract
Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) are a very popular class of distributed data structures that strike a compromise between strong and eventual consistency. Ensuring the protection of data stored within a CRDT, however, cannot be done trivially using standard encryption techniques, as secure CRDT protocols would require replica-side computation. This paper proposes an approach to lift general-purpose implementations of CRDTs to secure variants using secure multiparty computation (MPC). Each replica within the system is realized by a group of MPC parties that compute its functionality. Our results include: i) an extension of current formal models used for reasoning over the security of CRDT solutions to the MPC setting; ii) a MPC language and type system to enable the construction of secure versions of CRDTs and; iii) a proof of security that relates the security of CRDT constructions designed under said semantics to the underlying MPC library. We provide an open-source system implementation with an extensive evaluation, which compares different designs with their baseline throughput and latency.

Abstract
The application of machine learning to insurance risk prediction requires learning from sensitive data. This raises multiple ethical and legal issues. One of the most relevant ones is privacy. However, privacy-preserving methods can potentially hinder the predictive potential of machine learning models. In this paper, we present preliminary experiments with life insurance data using two privacy-preserving techniques: discretization and encryption. Our objective with this work is to assess the impact of such privacy preservation techniques in the accuracy of ML models. We instantiate the problem in three general, but plausible Use Cases involving the prediction of insurance claims within a 1-year horizon. Our preliminary experiments suggest that discretization and encryption have negligible impact in the accuracy of ML models.

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Abstract
Team automata describe networks of automata with input and output actions, extended with synchronisation policies guiding how many interacting components can synchronise on a shared input/output action. Given such a team automaton, we can reason over communication properties such as receptiveness (sent messages must be received) and responsiveness (pending receivesmust be satisfied). Previouswork focused on how to identify these communication properties. However, automatically verifying these properties is non-trivial, as it may involve traversing networks of interacting automata with large state spaces. This paper investigates (1) how to characterise communication properties for team automata (and subsumed models) using test-free propositional dynamic logic, and (2) how to use this characterisation to verify communication properties by model checking. A prototype tool supports the theory, using a transformation to interact with the mCRL2 tool for model checking.

Abstract
[No abstract available]

Abstract
Background: modern robots employ artificial intelligence algorithms in a broad ange of applications. These robots acquire information about their surroundings and use these highly-specialized algorithms to reason about their next actions. Despite their effectiveness, artificial intelligence algorithms are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks. This work focuses on mitigating attacks aimed at tampering with the communication channel between nodes running micro-ROS, which is an adaptation of the Robot Operating System (ROS) for extremely resource-constrained devices (usually assigned to collect information), and more robust nodes running ROS2, typically in charge of executing computationally costly tasks, like processing artificial intelligence algorithms. Methods: we followed the instructions described in the Data Distribution Service for Extremely Resource Constrained Environments (DDS-XRCE) specification on how to secure the communication between micro-ROS and ROS2 nodes and developed a custom communication transport that combines the application programming interface (API) provided by eProsima and the implementation of the Transport Security Layer version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) protocol developed by wolfSSL. Results: first, we present the first open-source transport layer based on TLS 1.3 to secure the communication between micro-ROS and ROS2 nodes, providing initial benchmarks that measure its temporal overhead. Second, we demystify how the DDS-XRCE and DDS Security specifications interact from a cybersecurity point of view. Conclusions: by providing a custom encrypted transport for micro-ROS and ROS2 applications to communicate, extremely resource-constrained devices can now participate in DDS environments without compromising the security, privacy, and authenticity of their message exchanges with ROS2 nodes. Initial benchmarks show that encrypted single-value messages present around 20% time overhead compared to the default non-encrypted micro-ROS transport. Finally, we presented an analysis of how the DDS-XRCE and DDS Security specifications relate to each other, providing insights not present in the literature that are crucial for further investigating the security characteristics of combining these specifications.