Abstract

Abstract

Abstract
We develop a theoretical framework to study the location-price competition in a Hotelling-type network game, extending the Hotelling model, with linear transportation costs, from a line (city) to a network (town). We show the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium price if, and only if, some explicit conditions on the production costs and on the network structure hold. Furthermore, we prove that the local optimal localization of the firms are at the cross-roads of the town.

Abstract
For the quadratic Hotelling model, we study the optimal localization and price strategies under incomplete information on the production costs of the firms. We compute explicitly the pure Bayesian-Nash price duopoly equilibrium and we prove that it does not depend upon the distributions of the production costs of the firms, except on their first moments. We find when the maximal differentiation is a local optimum for the localization strategy of both firms.

Abstract
We consider an R&D investment function in a Cournot duopoly competitionmodel inspired in the logistic equation. We study the economical effects resulting from the firms having different R&D efficiencies. We present three cases: (1) both firms are efficient and have the same degree of efficiency; (2) both firms are less efficient and have the same degree of efficiency; (3) firms are asymmetric in terms of the efficiency of their R&D investment programs.We study the myopic dynamics on the production costs obtained from investing the Nash investment equilibria. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016.

Abstract