Abstract
We introduce a resort pricing model, where different types of tourists choose between different resorts. We study the influence of the resort prices on the choices of the different types of tourists. We characterize the coherent strategies of the tourists that are Nash equilibria. We find the prices that lead to the bankruptcy of the resorts and, in particular, their dependence on the characteristics of the tourists.

Abstract
We use a new R&D investment function in a Cournot competition model inspired in the logistic equation. We present the full characterization of the associated gam; and study the short and long term economical effects derived from using this new R&D investment function. We observe the existence of four different Nash investment equilibria regions and fully characterize the boundaries of these regions.

Abstract
We introduce a renormalization scheme to study the asymptotic dynamical behaviour of a family of mechanical systems with non-isochronous potentials with an elliptic equilibrium. This renormalization scheme acts on a family of orbits of these mechanical systems, all of which are contained on neighbourhoods of the elliptic equilibrium, by rescaling space and shifting time in an appropriate way. We present some new results regarding the properties of this renormalization scheme, and examine the strong connection it has with the focal decomposition for the Euler-Lagrange equation of this family of mechanical systems.

Abstract
We consider an international trade economical model where two firms of different countries compete in quantities and can use three different strategies: (i) repealed collusion, (ii) deviation from the foreigner firm followed by punishment by he home country and then followed by repeated Cournot, or (iii) repeated deviation followed by punishment. In some cases (ii) and (iii) can be interpreted as dumping, We compute the profits of both firms for each strategy and we characterize the econc,mical parameters where each strategy is adopted by the firms.

Abstract

Abstract
We introduce a model of tourism choice where we consider that the choice of a tourism resort by a tourist, depends not only on the characteristics of the product offered by the resort but depends also on certain characteristics -crowding types- of the other tourists that have chosen the same resort. To get insights about the effect of crowding types in the allocation of tourists across resorts we exploit a club formation approach and model the framework by means of a Nash game. We establish existence of strategic equilibrium and characterize relevant equilibria.