Abstract
We study a classic international trade model consisting of a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments. The model is a two-stage game where, at the first stage, governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either (i) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (ii) cooperatively (social optimum). In the second stage, firms choose competitively (Nash) their home and export quantities. We compare the competitive (Nash) tariffs with the cooperative (social) tariffs and we classify the game type according to the coincidence or not of these equilibria as a social equilibrium, a prisoner's dilemma or a lose-win dilemma.

Abstract
We study a Cournot duopoly model using Ferreira-Oliveira-Pinto's R&D investment function. We find the multiple perfect Nash equilibria and we analyse the economical relevant quantities like output levels, prices, consumer surplus, profits and welfare.

Abstract
The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.

Abstract
One fundamental question in biology is population extinction and persistence, i.e., stability/instability of the extinction equilibrium and of non-extinction equilibria. In the case of nonlinear matrix models for structured populations, a bifurcation theorem answers this question when the projection matrix is primitive by showing the existence of a continuum of positive equilibria that bifurcates from the extinction equilibrium as the inherent population growth rate passes through 1. This theorem also characterizes the stability properties of the bifurcating equilibria by relating them to the direction of bifurcation, which is forward (backward) if, near the bifurcation point, the positive equilibria exist for inherent growth rates greater (less) than 1. In this paper we consider an evolutionary game theoretic version of a general nonlinear matrix model that includes the dynamics of a vector of mean phenotypic traits subject to natural selection. We extend the fundamental bifurcation theorem to this evolutionary model. We apply the results to an evolutionary version of a Ricker model with an added Allee component. This application illustrates the theoretical results and, in addition, several other interesting dynamic phenomena, such as backward bifurcation induced strong Allee effects.

Abstract
This book gathers carefully selected works in Mathematical Economics, on myriad topics including General Equilibrium, Game Theory, Economic Growth, Welfare, Social Choice Theory, Finance. It sheds light on the ongoing discussions that have brought together leading researchers from Latin America and Southern Europe at recent conferences in venues like Porto, Portugal; Athens, Greece; and Guanajuato, Mexico. With this volume, the editors not only contribute to the advancement of research in these areas, but also inspire other scholars around the globe to collaborate and research these vibrant, emerging topics.

Abstract
Galileo, in the seventeenth century, observed that the small oscillations of a pendulum seem to have constant period. In fact, the Taylor expansion of the period map of the pendulum is constant up to second order in the initial angular velocity around the stable equilibrium. It is well known that, for small oscillations of the pendulum and small intervals of time, the dynamics of the pendulum can be approximated by the dynamics of the harmonic oscillator. We study the dynamics of a family of mechanical systems that includes the pendulum at small neighbourhoods of the equilibrium but after long intervals of time so that the second order term of the period map can no longer be neglected. We analyze such dynamical behaviour through a renormalization scheme acting on the dynamics of this family of mechanical systems. The main theorem states that the asymptotic limit of this renormalization scheme is universal: it is the same for all the elements in the considered class of mechanical systems. As a consequence, we obtain a universal asymptotic focal decomposition for this family of mechanical systems. This paper is intended to be the first in a series of articles aiming at a semiclassical quantization of systems of the pendulum type as a natural application of the focal decomposition associated to the two-point boundary value problem.