Abstract
This paper presents a conjectured-price-response equilibrium approach for modeling both centralized generation (CG) and behind-the-meter distributed generation (BMDG). A Nash game is set up with two constraints linking the CG and BMDG decisions to satisfy both the electricity demand in an energy market and the firm capacity in a capacity market. CG agents maximize their market profits while BMDG customers minimize their net supply costs, making decisions on their annual capacity investments and hourly productions decisions. Customers' costs account for 1) the energy bought from the grid minus the BMDG energy surpluses sold; 2) the payment of the grid access tariff (power and energy-based terms) and 3) the BMDG capacity investments' costs. The equilibrium conditions enable to represent different degrees of oligopoly using conjectural variations in both the energy and capacity markets. This work proves that such an equilibrium problem can be solved through an equivalent, yet simpler-to-solve, quadratic minimization problem. Some case examples compare the results of the proposed joint energy and capacity equilibrium with those from an energy-only equilibrium. Among other conclusions, these cases show that the proposed equilibrium sends adequate economic signals to the consumers to taper off the total system peak demand, whenever the weight of the power-based term of the access tariff is not extremely high.

Abstract
Flexibility is key for the decarbonization of the energy sector, contributing to decrease uncertainty in the operation of distribution networks, due to the connection of renewable energy sources and electric vehicles. However, effective deployment requires interoperable and replicable solutions, technologically agnostic and independent from the role of each actor and market models adopted. This paper presents an overview of ongoing projects that aim to deliver and demonstrate interoperable solutions across the full value chain of the energy sector. The main objective and expected results of the H2020 InterConnect, EUniversal and OneNet projects will be presented. © 2021 The Institution of Engineering and Technology.

Abstract

Abstract
Fundamental electricity market models tend to underestimate the real market prices because they do not properly represent the real variable production cost of the generation units, nor the strategic markup that generation companies add to their costs to price the offered energy. This markup can increase bid prices above the marginal cost of the generation units, which may leave bids out of the market, decreasing the total cleared production, but increasing the final market price. This paper proposes a simple procedure, based on the real market outcomes, to estimate these markups and improve CEVESA MIBEL market model by reducing the gap between the simulated and the real market prices.

Abstract
This work presents a methodology to segment the MV electric grid into grid zones for which the active power flexibility needs that solve the forecasted voltage and current issues are computed. This methodology enables the Distribution System Operator (DSO) to publish flexibility needs per zones, allowing aggregators to offer flexibility by optimizing their portfolio of resources in each grid zone. A case study is used to support the methodology results and its performance, showing the feasibility of solving grid issues by activating flexibility per grid zones according to the proposed methodology. © 2022 IEEE.

Abstract
Building renewable energy communities (REC) involves investments on generation facilities (such as PV panels), technologies to provide flexibility (such as batteries), management platforms and ICT systems, as well as integrating other flexibility sources such as thermal storage or electric vehicles. The way investments are made by the REC's members and other third parties is in close relationship with the governance models of the REC in terms of energy, flexibility and costs and benefits sharing, which, in the end, constitute the overall REC's business model. This works provides a revision of the main financing mechanisms to invest on and build a REC, and of the associated governance and business models that result from the investments mechanisms selected and its implications on its day by day operation. © 2022 IEEE.