2022
Autores
Retorta, F; Gouveia, C; Sampaio, G; Bessa, R; Villar, J;
Publicação
International Conference on the European Energy Market, EEM
Abstract
This work presents a methodology to segment the MV electric grid into grid zones for which the active power flexibility needs that solve the forecasted voltage and current issues are computed. This methodology enables the Distribution System Operator (DSO) to publish flexibility needs per zones, allowing aggregators to offer flexibility by optimizing their portfolio of resources in each grid zone. A case study is used to support the methodology results and its performance, showing the feasibility of solving grid issues by activating flexibility per grid zones according to the proposed methodology. © 2022 IEEE.
2022
Autores
Sampaio G.; Gouveia C.; Bessa R.; Villar J.; Retorta F.; Carvalho L.; Merckx C.; Benothman F.; Promel F.; Panteli M.; Mourão R.L.; Louro M.; Águas A.; Marques P.;
Publicação
IET Conference Proceedings
Abstract
EUniversal project aims to facilitate the use of flexibility services and interlink distribution system's active management with electricity markets. Implementing market-based flexibility services implies a change in distribution network monitoring and control towards a more predictive approach. However, integrating cost-effective monitoring and control tools for the LV network is still quite challenging. Within the project, a set of operation and planning tools have been developed for a coordinated quantification and activation of flexibility in HV, MV and LV distribution networks. The paper presents the tools developed for the Portuguese pilot and shows preliminary results obtained when considering network operation scenarios characterized by large scale integration of DER and EV.
2022
Autores
Rocha, R; Retorta, F; Mello, J; Silva, R; Gouveia, C; Villar, J;
Publicação
TECHNOLOGIES, MARKETS AND POLICIES: BRINGING TOGETHER ECONOMICS AND ENGINEERING
Abstract
This paper proposes an energy community management system for local energy sharing with grid flexibility services to solve the potential grid constraints of the local distribution network. A three-stage model is proposed. Stage 1 is the individual minimization of the energy bill of each prosumer by optimizing the schedules of its battery. The second stage optimizes the energy bill of the energy community by sharing internally the prosumers energy surplus and re-dispatching their batteries, while guaranteeing that each new individual prosumer energy bill is always equal or less than its stage 1 bill. The third stage is performed by the DSO to solve the grid constraints by re-dispatching the batteries, curtailing local generation or reducing consumption. Stage 3 minimizes the impact on stage 2 by minimizing the loss of profit or utility of every prosumer which is compensated accordingly.
2023
Autores
Rocha, R; Silva, R; Mello, J; Faria, S; Retorta, F; Gouveia, C; Villar, J;
Publicação
ENERGIES
Abstract
This paper proposes a three-stage model for managing energy communities for local energy sharing and providing grid flexibility services to tackle local distribution grid constraints. The first stage addresses the minimization of each prosumer's individual energy bill by optimizing the schedules of their flexible resources. The second stage optimizes the energy bill of the whole energy community by sharing the prosumers' energy surplus internally and re-dispatching their batteries, while guaranteeing that each prosumer's new energy bill is always be equal to or less than the bill that results for this prosumer from stage one. This collective optimization is designed to ensure an additional collective benefit, without loss for any community member. The third stage, which can be performed by the distribution system operator (DSO), aims to solve the local grid constraints by re-dispatching the flexible resources and, if still necessary, by curtailing local generation or consumption. Stage three minimizes the impact on the schedule obtained at previous stages by minimizing the loss of profit or utility for all prosumers, which are furthermore financially compensated accordingly. This paper describes how the settlement should be performed, including the allocation coefficients to be sent to the DSO to determine the self-consumed and supplied energies of each peer. Finally, some case studies allow an assessment of the performance of the proposed methodology. Results show, among other things, the potential benefits of allowing the allocation coefficients to take negative values to increase the retail market competition; the importance of stage one or, alternatively, the need for a fair internal price to avoid unfair collective benefit sharing among the community members; or how stage three can effectively contribute to grid constraint solving, profiting first from the existing flexible resources.
2023
Autores
Mello, J; Retorta, F; Silva, R; Villar, J; Saraiva, JT;
Publicação
2023 19TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKET, EEM
Abstract
In Walrasian markets, an auctioneer proposes a price to the market participants, who react by revealing the quantities they are willing to buy or sell at this price. The auctioneer then proposes new prices to improve the demand and supply match until the equilibrium is reached. This market, common for stock exchanges, has also been proposed for electricity markets like power electricity exchanges, where iterations among auctioneer and market participants take place before the interval settlement period (ISP) until supply and demand match and a stable price is reached. We propose a Walrasian design for local electricity markets where the iterations between auctioneer and market participants happen in real time, so previous imbalances are used to correct the proposed price for the next ISP. The designs are simulated to test convergence and their capability of achieving efficient dynamic prices.
2023
Autores
Silva, R; Faria, S; Moreno, A; Retorta, F; Mello, J; Villar, J;
Publicação
2023 19TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKET, EEM
Abstract
When the price of the energy shared within an energy community is based on a local energy market, it is the responsibility of each participant to bid adequately so that participating provides a larger benefit than not participating. Alternatively, centralized energy community bill minimization may be an option, but a mechanism to share the collective benefits among the members is needed. This mechanism should be fair and easy to explain, no members should be harmed with respect to their individual optimal behavior and should provide the right economic signal. This paper analyses and compares some common pricing mechanisms for the internal compensation for the energy shared among the members of an energy community centrally managed. Simple case examples are used to identify those pricing mechanisms that are fairer and provide the righter economic signals to the participants.
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