Abstract
In Walrasian markets, an auctioneer proposes a price to the market participants, who react by revealing the quantities they are willing to buy or sell at this price. The auctioneer then proposes new prices to improve the demand and supply match until the equilibrium is reached. This market, common for stock exchanges, has also been proposed for electricity markets like power electricity exchanges, where iterations among auctioneer and market participants take place before the interval settlement period (ISP) until supply and demand match and a stable price is reached. We propose a Walrasian design for local electricity markets where the iterations between auctioneer and market participants happen in real time, so previous imbalances are used to correct the proposed price for the next ISP. The designs are simulated to test convergence and their capability of achieving efficient dynamic prices.

Abstract
When the price of the energy shared within an energy community is based on a local energy market, it is the responsibility of each participant to bid adequately so that participating provides a larger benefit than not participating. Alternatively, centralized energy community bill minimization may be an option, but a mechanism to share the collective benefits among the members is needed. This mechanism should be fair and easy to explain, no members should be harmed with respect to their individual optimal behavior and should provide the right economic signal. This paper analyses and compares some common pricing mechanisms for the internal compensation for the energy shared among the members of an energy community centrally managed. Simple case examples are used to identify those pricing mechanisms that are fairer and provide the righter economic signals to the participants.

Abstract
Energy Communities (ECS) and Self- consumption structures are receiving significant attention in Europe due to their potential contribution to a sustainable energy transition and the decarbonization process of the energy system. They are considered a powerful instrument to involve end-consumers in active participation in the energy system by becoming self-producers of renewable electricity and increasing their awareness of their potential contribution by adapting their energy behavior to the global or local power system needs. An EC can also contribute to alleviating energy poverty, which occurs when low incomes and poorly efficient buildings and appliances place a high proportion of energy costs on households. The main driver would be the reduction in energy costs obtained if some members agree to share their surplus electricity at a lower price with vulnerable members. Similarly, a renewable EC (REC) can facilitate access to energy assets by sharing the investments among the community members and exploiting existing complementarities. For example, vulnerable members could share their roofs with others to install solar panels in exchange for low-cost electricity. RECs can also help vulnerable members by reducing the barriers to accessing subsidies for building efficiency investments thanks to collective community initiatives, easing information dissemination and helping with bureaucratic processes. © 2003-2012 IEEE.