Abstract
Most of current physical-layer security techniques rely on a degraded eavesdropper, thus warranting some sort of advantage that can be relied upon to achieve higher levels of security. We consider instead non-degraded eavesdroppers, that possess equal or better capabilities than legitimate receivers. Under this challenging setup, most of current physical-layer security techniques become hard to administer and new dimensions to establish advantageous periods of communication are needed. For that, we characterize the secrecy level of two schemes for physical-layer security under non-degraded eavesdroppers: a spread spectrum uncoordinated frequency hopping scheme, and a jamming receiver with self-interference cancellation.

Abstract
Cloud computing is the latest trend in business for providing software, platforms and services over the Internet. However, a widespread adoption of this paradigm has been hampered by the lack of security mechanisms. In view of this, the aim of this work is to propose a new approach for detecting anomalies in cloud network traffic. The anomaly detection mechanism works on the basis of a Support Vector Machine (SVM). The key requirement for improving the accuracy of the SVM model, in the context of cloud, is to reduce the total amount of data. In light of this, we put forward the Poisson Moving Average predictor which is the core of the feature extraction approach and is able to handle the vast amount of information generated over time. In addition, two case studies are employed to validate the effectiveness of the mechanism on the basis of real datasets. Compared with other approaches, our solution exhibits the best performance in terms of detection and false alarm rates.

Abstract
We propose a coding scheme based on the combination of interleaving with systematic channel codes for secrecy. The basic idea consists of generating a random interleaving key that is used to shuffle/interleave information at the source. The message and the interleaving key are then both encoded with a systematic code and the part related to the interleaving key is removed/punctured before being sent to the channel, hence operating as a hidden key for any receiver (legitimate or not) that needs to deinterleave the message. Successfully obtaining the original message then depends on determining the interleaving key, which can only be done through the parity bits that result from jointly encoding the interleaving key and the message. We provide a method to determine the necessary signal-to-noise ratio difference that enables successful reception at the legitimate receiver without the eavesdropper having access to the message. In addition, we provide evidence that this scheme may also be used to turn a realistic channel into a discrete memoryless channel, thus providing a first practical implementation of an abstract channel that can be employed with a wiretap code to provide information-theoretic security guarantees. © 2015 IEEE.

Abstract
In this work we identify a seminal design guideline that prevents current Full-Duplex (FD) MAC protocols to scale the FD capacity gain (i.e. 2× the half-duplex throughput) in single-cell Wi-Fi networks. Under such guideline (referred to as 1-1), a MAC protocol attempts to initiate up to two simultaneous transmissions in the FD bandwidth. Since in single-cell Wi-Fi networks MAC performance is bounded by the PHY layer capacity, this implies gains strictly less than 2× over half-duplex at the MAC layer. To face this limitation, we argue for the 1:N design guideline. Under 1:N, FD MAC protocols 'see' the FD bandwidth through N>1 orthogonal narrow-channel PHY layers. Based on theoretical results and software defined radio experiments, we show the 1:N design can leverage the Wi-Fi capacity gain more than 2× at and below the MAC layer. This translates the denser modulation scheme incurred by channel narrowing and the increase in the spatial reuse factor enabled by channel orthogonality. With these results, we believe our design guideline can inspire a new generation of Wi-Fi MAC protocols that fully embody and scale the FD capacity gain. © 2016 IEEE.

Abstract
This paper presents a new technique for providing the analysis and comparison of wiretap codes in the small blocklength regime over the binary erasure wiretap channel. A major result is the development of Monte Carlo strategies for quantifying a code's equivocation, which mirrors techniques used to analyze forward error correcting codes. For this paper, we limit our analysis to coset-based wiretap codes, and give preferred strategies for calculating and/or estimating the equivocation in order of preference. We also make several comparisons of different code families. Our results indicate that there are security advantages to using algebraic codes for applications that require small to medium blocklengths. © 2017 IEEE.

Abstract
Current physical-layer security techniques typically rely on a degraded eavesdropper, thus warranting some sort of advantage that can be relied upon to achieve higher levels of security. We consider instead non-degraded eavesdroppers that possess equal or better capabilities than legitimate receivers. Under this challenging setup, most of the current physical-layer security techniques become hard to administer and new dimensions to establish advantageous periods of communication are needed. For that, we consider employing a spread spectrum uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) scheme aided by friendly jammers for improved secrecy. We characterize the secrecy level of this spread spectrum scheme, by devising a stochastic geometry mathematical model to assess the secure packet throughput (probability of secure communication) of devices operating under UFH that accommodates the impact of friendly jammers. We further implement and evaluate these techniques in a real-world test-bed of software-defined radios. Results show that although UFH with jamming leads to low secure packet throughput values, by exploiting frequency diversity, these methods may be used for establishing secret keys. We propose a method for secret-key establishment that builds on the advantage provided by UFH and jamming to establish secret keys, notably against non-degraded adversary eavesdroppers that may appear in advantageous situations. © 2005-2012 IEEE.